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The United States of America’s interlocked information
industry: An examination into seven U.S. media sectors’
boards of directors
Jennifer L. Harker
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ABSTRACT
This research explores the inter!rm interlock networks that cur-
rently exist among publicly traded media conglomerates operating
in the United States of America. Directorship information was gath-
ered from annual reports and de!nitive proxy reports !led with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for 68 media conglomer-
ates across seven media sectors for year ending 2018. This investi-
gation applies social resource theory to assess the social networks
formed by inter!rm interlocks among media conglomerates and
how such network structures address environmental uncertainty.
Results indicate that not all alliances are mutually bene!cial and
those that are more resource-dependent endure negative coopta-
tion e"ects. Moreover, today’s !nancial interlocks look very di"er-
ent than they did at the turn of the century. This research discusses
how these changes in inter!rm interlocks have resulted in director-
ship wars. Practical implications are discussed.
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Directorship wars are being waged within media conglomerates in the United States of
America (U.S./American). Media conglomerates operating in the U.S. are pressured by
majority shareholders to place preferential individuals on media conglomerates’ boards of
directors. In early 2019, a battle occurred between Gannett and its majority stakeholder,
MNG [MediaNews Group] Enterprises, Inc., which is a subsidiary of Alden Global Capital.
MNG, also known as Digital First Media (MNG Enterprises, Inc., 2019), submitted at least
25 proxy statements to Gannett’s stakeholders via the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to push its agenda for three named directors to be placed on
Gannett’s board. Gannett pushed back, and according to the vote tally from the annual
shareholders meeting held on 17 May 2019, Gannett won that battle and all three of its
current directors retained their seats (Gannett Investor Relations, 2019; O’Connell, 2019).
Since, GannettmergedwithNewMedia Investment Group and only three of Gannett’s nine
directors were allowed to continue to serve on the newly-merged board.
Newspaper organisations are not the only media conglomerates being pressured for
board seats. MDC Partners Inc., which owns and operates numerous advertising and
public relations agencies, settled a legal matter with its majority shareholder, hedge fund
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FrontFour Capital Group LLC in April 2019 regarding MDC’s board (MDC, 2019;
Thomas, 2019). Part of that agreement was the placement of Kristen O’Hara to MDC’s
board and the co-vetting of a second future director. The hedge fund was seeking three
seats on MDC’s board.
The television and radio broadcast, and motion picture sectors also forming new
boards and restructuring others as a result of recent mergers and bankruptcies. For
example, twenty-!rst Century Fox merged with The Walt Disney Company and the
newly separated Fox Corporation, the parent of Fox News, has added former U.S.
Speaker of the House, Republican Paul Ryan to its board of directors (Stelter, 2019).
Radio conglomerate iHeartMedia !led Chapter 11 bankruptcy and reported in
November 2018 its “post-emergence board” (iHeartMedia, 2018).
So, what does all this mean exactly? It means that publicly traded media conglomerates
experience the same boardroom brawls as other industries, but research on thesematters in
the media industry is sparse, and for somemedia sectors, nonexistent (An& Jin, 2004; Han,
1988; Picard, 2006, 1994; Simmons, 2012, 2011). Board governance is a critical aspect to
monitor regarding media organisations because the media’s political and social in"uence
remains “critical to human society” (Artero, 2009, p. 23). Governance is expected of share-
holders and the role of that governance is to in"uence management (Picard, 2005a). In
media organisations, will such governance continue to support the civic watchdog duties of
journalism? Or will such governance eventually give way to agenda-cutting due to the
economic, political, or social pressures that trickle down to newsrooms (Colistra, 2018,
2012)? Are the directorship wars the tell-tale signs that the days of strategic selection of
board members are coming to an end for media conglomerates? The current research
examines today’s directorships across seven media sectors: advertising, cable, motion
picture/video production, newspaper, radio, and television to explore these questions.
This study applies a network perspective as both the theoretical and methodological
approach to examine interlocks among media conglomerates in the U.S. Past approaches to
studying the phenomenon of board interlocks have included network analyses (Beckman,
Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004; Koenig & Gogel, 1981; Lamb & Roundy, 2016; Palmer,
Friedland, & Singh, 1986; Xia, Wang, Lin, Yang, & Li, 2018), but none such network studies
have focused on board interlocks across U.S. media sectors (Picard, 2006). The current
research addresses this gap in the interlocking, media studies and the network literatures.
Literature review
A board directorship provides corporate governance and oversight for publicly traded
organisations (Artero, 2009). Directors are recruited for their power, prestige, and prowess
and these individuals are asked to serve on the board of directors because of what they can
bring to or o#er the organisation through resources, expertise, or reputation (Lamb &
Roundy, 2016; Mizruchi, 1996; Schoorman, Bazerman, & Atkin, 1981; Zajac & Westphal,
1996). In the media sector, corporate governance is often handled by the board of directors
(Artero, 2009). A conglomerate’s chief executive o$cer (CEO) serves as board president
(Mizruchi, 1996; Zajac & Westphal, 1996) and the CEO and directors govern the highest
level of operations to provide oversight regarding legal, !nancial, political, social, and
personnel matters (An & Jin, 2005, 2004; Artero, 2009; Han, 1988; Mizruchi, 1996;
Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988; Palmer et al., 1986; Simmons, 2012). Directors are recruited to
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serve on media conglomerate boards for their expertise in the industry, perceived prestige
in the media industry, or because that person is well connected to resources of interest for
the media organisation (Lamb & Roundy, 2016; Mizruchi, 1996; Schoorman et al., 1981;
Zajac & Westphal, 1996).
When a director agrees to serve on a board, that director forms an inter!rm interlock
between two or more organisations; their own business(es) and that of the board on
which they serve (Mizruchi, 1996). When a person a$liated with one business or “!rm,”
sits on the board of directors of another, an “interlocking” of the two !rms create a
networked inter!rm tie (Mizruchi, 1996, p. 271). Inter!rm interlocks create connections
between organisations and in"uential individuals for mutual bene!t (Lamb & Roundy,
2016). These bene!ts range from personal to organisational. At the personal level,
bene!ts include career advancement and social cohesion (Mizruchi, 1996; Mizruchi &
Stearns, 1988). Serving on a board expands the directors’ social network, advances career
opportunities, and can be mutually bene!cial for the directors’ !rm(s) as well. At the
organisational level, interlocks are sought by organisations for resource exchange (!nan-
cial or other critical resources), monitoring, signalling, and for reputation or image
transfer in the building up of human capital for perceived organisational legitimacy
(Lamb & Roundy, 2016). Other resultant bene!ts from interlocks include access to
diverse or unique information, shaping perceptions of the organisation, improving
organisational performance, resource exchange; and the di#usion of strategies, practices
and ideas–all in the quest for reduction of environmental uncertainty. This research,
therefore, explores the individual, organisational, and sector-level challenges and bene!ts
of interlocks within media conglomerates operating in the U.S.
Environmental uncertainty leads to resource dependency
Environmental uncertainty, such as economic instability or rapid technological change, leads
organisations to form alliances (Beckman et al., 2004; Xia et al., 2018). Alliances are formed
with individuals and organisations that can link the media conglomerate to the resources
needed to weather the storms of uncertainty (Lamb & Roundy, 2016; Lang & Lockhart, 1990;
Schoorman et al., 1981; Simmons, 2012). For example, economic instability leads organisa-
tions to increase interlocks with !nancial institutions (Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988).
Environmental uncertainty is experienced at both the organisational level as well as at the
industry or sector level (Beckman et al., 2004; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988). An example of
sector-level uncertainty occurred when the whole newspaper sector experienced a shift to
digital subscriptions, and thus print advertising income decreased (Mirer &Harker, 2019). Or
at the organisational level, when a newspaper conglomerate experienced environmental
uncertainty if it was slow to adopt digital subscriptions as paper subscriptions began to fade.
Resources can become scarcer when sector-level uncertainty occurs. The more con-
strained a sector, the more niche the interlocks sought with prestigious individuals and
organisations that can help reduce that uncertainty (Galaskiewicz, Wasserman,
Rauschenbach, Bielefeld, & Mullaney, 1985; Lang & Lockhart, 1990; Zajac & Westphal,
1996). Alternatively, Beckman et al. (2004) noted that organisational-level uncertainty
causes organisations to “exploit and reinforce their networks” by “adding additional
interlock and alliance relationships” (p. 272). In other words, when sector-level uncer-
tainty is absent, organisations can seek broader or more diverse interlocks.
JOURNAL OF MEDIA BUSINESS STUDIES 3
Functional and speci!c alliances
The establishment of speci!c bene!cial alliances were best explained by Weiss (1974) in
the early discussions regarding functional speci!city. Functional speci!city hypothesises
that organisations activate ties with certain other individuals, organisations, and industry
sectors for access to necessary resources (Perry & Pescosolido, 2010; Weiss, 1974;
Wellman & Wortley, 1990). These functional and speci!c alliances create inter!rm
interlocks that aid in meeting needs during times of uncertainty by “stabilizing the
resource "ow” and by strengthening “social power by a$liating with other important
players” (Xia et al., 2018, p. 1900). Functional speci!city, therefore, connects individuals
and organisations in purposeful ways to best address resource dependency.
Resource dependency
Resource dependency is de!ned as a reliance on outside sources to meet operational
needs. Resource dependency is driven by those functional and speci!c strategies men-
tioned above in an e#ort to obtain the resources necessary for daily business functions.
Resource dependency is often rooted in perception (Wry, Cobb, & Aldrich, 2013) and
possesses “power imbalances” (Zona, Gomez-Mejia, & Withers, 2018, p. 591). The power
imbalances, depending on how much the resource is needed, can become so dependent
that interlocks can lead to overwhelming interdependence that results in interlocks that
in!ltrate organisational operations and leaves organisations vulnerable and over-depen-
dent (Lang & Lockhart, 1990; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988).
Board interlocks that form in response to resource dependency have been researched by
economists and sociologists for decades because board interlocks are in direct relation to, and
an assumed remedy for environmental uncertainty (Lamb&Roundy, 2016; Lang& Lockhart,
1990; Schoorman et al., 1981; Simmons, 2012). Board interlocks aid resource dependency (Xia
et al., 2018; Zona et al., 2018) through cooptation (Mizruchi, 1996;Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988).
Cooptation “involves surrendering a certain amount of autonomy in return for access to
resources” (Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988, p. 195). An example of cooptation of directors for
resource exchange would be a board member who is a bank executive or a venture capitalist
that o#ers access to !nancial resources. Therefore, it is these linkages established between
organisations and outside individuals and their organisations, that best address resource
dependency, but can come at a high price.
Resource dependency also stretches across horizontal and vertical exchanges (Pfe#er
& Salancik, 2003; Xia et al., 2018; Zona et al., 2018), meaning that functional speci!city
will cause an individual or organisation to seek out peers (horizontal) or industry leaders
(vertical) for resources. There are four ways in which interlocks have assumed bene!t
regarding resource dependency: horizontal coordination linking competitors; vertical
coordination linking an organisation with suppliers of inputs or receivers of outputs;
expertise; and by enhanced reputation (Schoorman et al., 1981, p. 243). What this means
is when environmental uncertainty is occurring, organisations might exchange resources
horizontally with similar or competitor organisations, or an organisation might seek out
alliances with organisations vertically superior or inferior. Expertise and reputation links
back to prestige being a key indicator for director selection (Galaskiewicz et al., 1985).
In sum, environmental uncertainty leads to resource dependency. Inter!rm interlocks
aid in accessing necessary resources during times of uncertainty. Such an exchange of
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resources among these functional and speci!c alliances that form can become critical to
the wellbeing of organisations. As such, the !rst research question is posited:
RQ1: How are today’s U.S. media conglomerates addressing resource dependency through
board interlocks?
The next section explains how and why board interlocks have formed among media
organisations in the U.S. over the past four decades (Picard, 2006) and how such alliances
address resource dependency.
Board interlocks among media conglomerates in the U.S
According to Picard (2006), media economics researchers explore howmedia organisations
behave, communicate, and operate in response to !nancial and societal structures.
Corporate governance across media sectors can be challenging to harness and assess. This
is because of themedia industry experiences similar !nancial andmanagerial challenges and
opportunities as other industries, but because of the diverse variance of media products,
each media sector can vary widely in best practices and in operations (Picard, 2005b). Still
though, several ongoing risks stretch across all media sectors creating environmental
uncertainty and thus resource dependency. The risks to operations and economic viability
of the media industry include technology shifts, the evolution of !nancial markets and
global economies, the impact of corporate acquisitions, competition, legal considerations
and labour disputes, just to name a few (Artero, 2009, pp. 133–134; Picard, 2003).
Media and technology have followed along a nonlinear evolutionary process creating
numerous “infrastructures and institutions in the past century” that now include media
sectors spanning newspapers, telephony, movies, radio, television, satellite-based cable
television, and advertising and public relations agencies (Logan, 2007; Neuman, 2010, p.
1; Scolari, 2013). Further, each of these sectors uniquely navigate the digital and techno-
logical advancements brought on by the twenty-!rst century’s implementation of the
internet. Such technological dynamism, which is the process of technological change that
a#ects organisations both internally and externally (Tatarynowicz, Sytch, & Gulati, 2016),
alongside growing environmental uncertainty for some media sectors, couple to reshape
the composition of media conglomerates’ leadership and governance structures.
Three multi-sector studies have explored these structures. Han (1988) conducted
research on board interlocks among media conglomerates in the U.S. by examining the
leading 50 publicly traded media !rms of the time to investigate resource dependency
upon advertising, !nancial constraints, and market diversi!cation in relation to board
interlocks. Han’s approach was to examine the directors representative of advertisers,
!nancial institutions, law !rms, and competitors. The average number of directors in the
1980s was 11.94, and in order of frequencies, those most common interlocked directors
hailed from the !nancial, advertiser, law, and competitor sectors. Han’s work paved the
way for subsequent examinations.
In the time that passed between Han’s research on 50 publicly traded media conglom-
erates in 1987 to An’s and Jin’s research in the early 2000s, media conglomerates had
already begun to consume the smaller organisations. An and Jin (2004) therefore
reviewed whether !nancial dependency of the remaining 13 publicly traded newspaper
publishing conglomerates resulted in interlocks re"ective of that dependency. The gap in
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time from Han’s (1988) research was accounted for by the authors by conducting a
longitudinal study spanning the years 1988 to 2000. Results indicated that conglomerates
with higher !nancial dependency were more likely to interlock with capital resources.
This result was further compounded when internal sources of !nancial support
decreased. The larger media conglomerates in this study ranged in !nancial interlocks
from 45% to 60% of the board’s structure but overall between 13% and 57%; and
advertising directors ranged from zero to 31%. An & Jin’s hypotheses, that stated
environmental uncertainty and resource dependency would result in an increase of
!nancial and advertiser director interlocks, were only partially supported.
Finally, the third interlocking study conducted within the media industry spanned from
1990 to 2009 and reviewed 17 publicly traded media conglomerates (Simmons, 2012).
Simmons’ research stretched across !ve media sectors to include newspaper, radio,
television, movie production, and digital media outlets. Simmons, who also researched
the legal considerations regarding media interlocks (2011), investigated the changes the
media industry had faced during that time period as the industry shifted to digital
platforms. Key !ndings noted that media conglomerates responded more to economic
instability than to technological change, or technological dynamism (Tatarynowicz et al.,
2016). Therefore, media conglomerates that experienced the highest levels of environ-
mental uncertainty recruited directors from !nancial institutions and advertisers.
Taken together, environmental uncertainty leads organisations to seek out function-
ally speci!c alliances in an e#ort to connect to the necessary resources that organisations
depend upon for survival. Functional, speci!c-interlocked directorates help to reduce
environmental uncertainty and aids technological change through these strategic alli-
ances (Beckman et al., 2004; Tatarynowicz et al., 2016). Considering these matters, the
following hypothesis is presented:
H1:Although today’s U.S. media conglomerates across the seven sectors have di#ered
regarding adaption to technological change, inter!rm interlocks with digital or technologi-
cal organisations will be present across all media sectors.
The research to this point has explained that resource dependency is determined by
environmental uncertainty (Xia et al., 2018). This research argues that by examining
media interlocks through a network perspective, a more precise view into the strategic
nature of media interlocks may be revealed. The next section provides an overview of this
approach to position the theoretical argument and the methodological approach.
Applying the network perspective to today’s U.S. media board interlocks
The network perspective is a descriptive examination of sociological connections.
Networks are made up of nodes and ties, and each can be operationalised in virtually
non-exhaustive ways, as long as the node is an entity or actor that connects (or ties) to
other nodes in a network of some speci!ed manner (Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2013;
Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell, 2011). A node in this research is operationalised as a media
conglomerate and its ties to the directors (and each directors’ organisation) serving on
the media conglomerate’s board, (Palmer et al., 1986).
The network perspective examines how nodes are interconnected (network architec-
ture) and the opportunities that exist among those connections for an exchange of
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resources (network "ow). The "ow of resources through networked individuals and
organisations is best de!ned by Lin’s (2017, 1999a) social resource theory. Social resource
theory is rooted in the foundational perspectives of social capital (Bourdieu, 1985) and
connects to Coleman’s (1988) work regarding the bene!ts of human capital. Social
resource theory suggests that social embeddedness, and therefore access to resources,
can best address environmental uncertainty (Burt, 2004; Granovetter, 1973).
Lin (1999b) asserted that social resources are “accessible through one’s direct and
indirect ties” (p. 467). Lin’s application of network theory to the concept of social capital
resulted in the formulation of three propositions: (1) that social resources are accessed in
social networks to exert a speci!ed outcome; (2) the strength of position where desired
social resources are located in the network; and (3) the strength of ties to social resources
and whether activation is vertical or horizontal in nature (p. 470). Social resource theory
thus connects to the interlocking literature because it is well established that organisa-
tions form alliances to reduce environmental uncertainties such as economic instability
(Beckman et al., 2004) and technological change (Tatarynowicz et al., 2016). The
organisations “with power from a central network position” are best positioned to survive
uncertainty, instability, and withstand change because they are better positioned for
resource exchange (Xia et al., 2018, p. 1916).
This underlying premise to social resource theory that individuals, or organisations
through its individuals’ connections, access, and mobilise resources embedded within
their social networks results in increased human capital and a higher exchange of social
resources (Burt, 2004; Coleman, 1988; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998), makes social resource
theory the appropriate theoretical framework with which to examine board interlocks.
This is especially true given that interlocking research stretches across levels of measure-
ment from a micro or individual level to organisational and industry or sector levels of
measurement. The micro-level data typically collected in directorship investigations
possesses implications at the meso or macro levels (Koenig & Gogel, 1981). Network
statistics allows for such a multi-level, whole-view examination of the individual-to-
organisation and the organisation-to-industry levels of analysis (Xia et al., 2018).
Taken together, social resource theory’s descriptive, multi-level network structure can
identify the “compositional quality” of interconnected media conglomerates and whether
or in what ways media conglomerates’ needs are being met by board interlocks (Borgatti,
Jones, & Everett, 1998, p. 30; Lin, 2017). As such, this research examines the social
network architecture and "ow of resource dependency and exchange among interlocked
individuals and organisations across seven sectors of the U.S. media industry. The
resource dependency and exchange cluster of network theories are applied to provide a
multi-level framework for the assessment of the current sociological networks created by
the publicly traded media conglomerates operating in the United States of America
(Monge & Contractor, 2003).
This research, therefore, sets out to build upon past media economic studies (An & Jin,
2005, 2004; Artero, 2009; Han, 1988; Picard, 2006, 2005a; Simmons, 2012, 2011) and
posits the following additional research question and hypothesis regarding the investiga-
tion of media conglomerates’ board interlocks from a network perspective through the
lens of social resource theory:
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RQ2: What can the network architecture and "ow of today’s U.S. media conglomerates’
board interlocks explain and what do these structures suggest regarding resource exchange
and dependency across the individual, organizational and sector levels?
Researchers have warned that interlocks can result in in!ltration and organisations
should remain cautious of relying on high levels of interdependence. Taking this into
consideration, how might social resource theory be demonstrated throughout the whole
network of U.S. media sectors? This research hypothesises the following:
H2: The advertising sector holds a central position within the U.S. media conglomerates’
network.
The next section provides a detailed account regarding the speci!c methods and mea-
surements applied to address the research questions and hypotheses guiding this
research. The method section begins with an explanation of the network measurements
applied and then details the data gathering and data analysis approach.
Method
It is important to note that there are two approaches to researching networks: whole
networks or ego networks (Borgatti et al., 2013; Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell, 2011; Perry,
Pescosolido, & Borgatti, 2018). A whole network encompasses all possible connections
within a speci!ed boundary. Alternatively, an ego network examines one entity’s (an ego)
connections (Borgatti et al., 2013). Coleman (1988) argued that an ego’s connections
become that ego’s human capital because those connections work together to help the
ego acquire or exchange resources. Arguably, each media conglomerate possesses its own
ego network; however, this research takes a sociological stance regarding U.S. media and
examines the sociological phenomena of the dependency and exchange network theories
at play across the seven sectors. Therefore, ego networks would be too micro to examine
alone. So, a whole network analysis was included to this investigation, as is supported by
researchers who assert that inter!rm interlocks explored through network structures
require the whole network approach (Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997).
Data identi!cation
A census of U.S. media-related conglomerates was collected. This data gathering process was
conducted using online business and governmental databases and search engines to locate
publicly available information. First, all businesses in the United States of America registered to
operate under the various Information Services categorisation (cf. Xia et al., 2018) were
gathered through identi!cation and registration under the North American Industry
Classi!cation System (NAICS). The NAICS code system is a federal system used to classify
all U.S. industries into 20 categories. The NAICS codes were established in 1997 to replace the
Standard Industrial Classi!cation (SIC) code1 (United States Census Bureau, 2017). The
categorisations under the “Information” industry include newspaper publishers, radio and
television broadcasting, news syndicates, and internet publishing. For example, the NAICS
code for newspaper publishers begins with 51111, radio and television broadcasting 51511,
news syndicates 51911, and Internet publishing is 51913. Extending this investigation, numer-
ous other mass communication conglomerates not investigated in prior media studies were
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included: advertising and public relations agencies and advertising services (54181, 541812),
and digital advertising [independent representatives primarily engaged in sellingmedia time or
space for media owners speci!cally online] (54184, 54187, 541813) conglomerates were
collected. Further, cable and other subscription programming (51521), and the motion picture
and video production (51211) also were included in this investigation. See Table 1 for a full list
of conglomerate organisations.
Data regarding all public and private U.S. media-related conglomerates operating in the U.S.
under anNAICS codewere gathered using theMergent Intellect online database. The database is
available through theprimary investigator’suniversity library services. First, each industry sector’s
code was entered into the industry search capability and all data regarding each conglomerate
listed under that industry categorisation were downloaded into excel spreadsheets. TheMergent
Intellect online database is connected to D-U-N-S identi!cation system through Dun &
Bradstreet which “continually veri!es records using a wide variety of sources.” Mergent
Intellect also displays the date when the last edit was made to each organisation’s available
information. The oldest record within this initial dataset was dated February 2017 and the
majority of recordswere updatedduring spring 2018.The excel spreadsheets of all conglomerates
classi!ed as speci!ed in the paragraphs above were downloaded and saved. Each publicly traded
media conglomeratewas identi!ed in those datasets. The non-publicly traded organisationswere
eliminated from this interlocking investigationbecause information regardingboards of directors
are not consistently available, if boards exist at all (cf: Beckman et al., 2004).
Data collection
The directors for each of the publicly tradedmedia conglomerates were then collected. Directors
were identi!ed and veri!ed in a two-step process. Directors were identi!ed by pulling each
conglomerate’s 10-K annual report and DEF 14 de!nitive proxy reports from the EDGAR
database available at the SEC website [sec.gov]. This process, informed by past research, also
helped to verify the conglomerates still operating and this processwas e#ective in the collection of
the most updated directorship information (Beckman et al., 2004; Han, 1988; Simmons, 2011).
The 10-K annual reports and de!nitive proxy report !lings by the conglomerates list all directors
and were !led after the calendar year 2018 concluded. The majority of the annual reports were
!led Feb. 2019. When no recent SEC !lings for 2018 or 2019 were recorded in the EDGAR
database or when the conglomerate was "agged as terminated or acquired, that media conglom-
eratewas removed from the studybecause the absence of SEC!lingswas deemeda veri!cationof
discontinuedbusiness operations.AllDEF14proxy reportswere collected for each conglomerate
still in operation.The proxy reports list all current directors and include director biographieswith
their most recent employment, as well as executive compensation in the “summary compensa-
tion table” and director compensation in the “director compensation table.”Each conglomerates’
board president (often the CEO) and directors’ compensation data were collected from these
o$cial reports (Beckman et al., 2004; Simmons, 2012: Zajac & Westphal, 1996). Finally, each
director’s most recent place of employment was collected from the proxy reports to examine the
inter!rm interlocks present among these media conglomerates.
Once all directorship information was collected for the media conglomerates across the
seven media sectors [advertising, cable, digital advertising, motion picture and video produc-
tion, newspaper, radio, and television], each directors’ most recent employer was then cate-
gorised using the NAICS code alongside an online search to verify the director’s connection to
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the reportedmost recent employer. Executives who sat on their own boardswere fully recorded
but were not included in the current employer categorisation (cf: Mizruchi, 1996).
Then, another layer of categorisation of those NAICS codes was conducted mirroring
Simmons (2012) prior research, which used the following broad inter!rm interlock resource
categories: Media, which included newspaper, motion picture, radio, broadcast and cable
television, and publishing; Digital-Technology, which include computer, cybersecurity, soft-
ware, electronics, telecommunication, internet, arti!cial intelligence, virtual reality, and
bitcoin; Financial, included banking, accounting, insurance, venture capital, investment
!rms, brokerage or holding companies, real estate, and business management and consul-
tancies (cf. Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988). Advertisers, included manufacturers, retailers, sports
teams and clubs, travel agencies, celebrity agents or entertainment promoters, chain restau-
rants, large health-care systems, and pharma; Law, included law !rms and lawyers. One
category was extended to catch the Government/Nonpro!t/Education organisations left over
from the other resource categories. The Government/Nonpro!t/Education category included
educational institutions, trade associations, governmental agencies or politicians, public utility
companies, and civic and social organisations (Beckman et al., 2004).
Social network analysis centrality measurements were analysed using NodeXL Pro Version
1.0.1.413 (Smith et al., 2010). Illustrations of the social networks, or sociograms, which o#er a
visual representation of a network and aids the researcher in examining the architecture of a
network (Scott, 1988), were constructed using NodeXL Pro. Centrality measurements, which
assess a node’s access to resources throughout its network, were calculated to explore how
many connections a node has (i.e. degree centrality), how many other nodes must be passed
through to reach destinations within the network (i.e. betweenness centrality), and how many
connections a node’s connections have (i.e. eigenvector centrality) to assess the full reach of
nodes throughout the network (Opsahl, Agneessens, & Skvoretz, 2010).
Results
The !rst research question asked how today’s U.S. media conglomerates’ board interlocksmight
address resource dependency. To explore this question, media conglomerates were gathered
across sevenmedia sectors: advertising (n= 15), cable (n= 10), digital advertising (n = 4),motion
picture and video production (n = 2), newspaper (n = 12), radio (n = 13), and television (n = 12).
The method described above resulted in the collection of all members of the boards of
directors (N = 602, [n = 582 unique directors; 28 duplicates]) for each of the publicly
traded media conglomerates (n = 68) in the U.S. Executives who sat on their own boards
(n = 122) were recorded and these instances are notated as “Org” in the inter!rm
interlock resource categories. There were 412 unique inter!rm interlocks (i.e. directors’
most recent or current employer). The resource categories representative of the directors’
organisations included media (n = 117), digital-technology (n = 48), !nancial (n = 182),
advertisers (n = 77), law (n = 18), and government/nonpro!t/education (n = 45).
Directorships ranged from 3 to 16 directors. The largest directorships included AMC
Networks Inc (n = 16), The Walt Disney Company (n = 16), The New York Times
Company (n = 14), Berkshire Hathaway Inc (n = 14), MSG Networks Inc (n = 13), and
Sirius XM Holdings Inc (n = 13). The average compensation across all directors was
$1,387,752, but this includes annual compensation of executives who served on their own
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Table 1. Publiclytraded media conglomerates across seven media sectors in the U.S.
Media Conglomerate Media Sector
Number of
Directors
1. A. H. BELO CORPORATION Newspaper 8
2. AMC NETWORKS INC Television 16
3. ANGI HOMESERVICES INC Advertising 11
4. BEASLEY BROADCAST GROUP INC Radio 9
5. BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC Newspaper 14
6. CABLE ONE INC Cable 8
7. CBS CORPORATION Television 12
8. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS INC Cable 13
9. COMCAST CORPORATION Television 13
10. CUMULUS MEDIA INC Radio 7
11. DAILY JOURNAL CORPORATION Newspaper 5
12. DIGITAL BRAND MEDIA & MARKETING GROUP INC Advertising 3
13. DISCOVERY INC Cable 12
14. DISH NETWORK CORPORATION Cable 10
15. E.W. SCRIPPS COMPANY Television 9
16. EMMIS COMMUNICATIONS CORP Radio 9
17. ENTERCOM COMMUNICATIONS CORP Radio 9
18. ENTRAVISION COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION Television 7
19. GANNETT CO INC Newspaper 10
20. GRAHAM HOLDINGS COMPANY Newspaper 10
21. GRAY TELEVISION INC Television 11
22. GROUPON INC. Advertising 9
23. HEMISPHERE MEDIA GROUP INC Cable 10
24. IHEARTMEDIA INC Radio 13
25. INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF COMPANIES INC Advertising 11
26. IZEA WORLDWIDE INC Advertising 8
27. LEAF GROUP LTD Digital Advertising 9
28. LEE ENTERPRISES INCORPORATED Newspaper 9
29. LIBERATED SYNDICATION INC Radio 4
30. LIBERTY MEDIA CORPORATION Cable 9
31. LIVE VENTURES INC Digital Advertising 5
32. LIVEXLIVE MEDIA INC Radio 5
33. MARCHEX INC Digital Advertising 3
34. MCCLATCHY COMPANY Newspaper 12
35. MDC PARTNERS INC Advertising 11
36. MOBIQUITY TECHNOLOGIES INC Advertising 6
37. MSG NETWORKS INC Cable 13
38. NATIONAL CINEMEDIA LLC Advertising 9
39. NETFLIX INC Motion Picture/Video 11
40. NEW MEDIA INVESTMENT GROUP INC Newspaper 5
41. NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY Newspaper 14
42. NEWS CORPORATION Newspaper 11
43. NEXSTAR MEDIA GROUP INC Television 9
44. NTN BUZZTIME INC Television 6
45. OMNICOM GROUP INC Advertising 11
46. QUOTIENT TECHNOLOGY INC Advertising 9
47. ROKU INC Cable 7
48. ROPER TECHNOLOGIES INC Advertising 10
49. RUBICON PROJECT INC Advertising 7
50. SAGA COMMUNICATIONS INC Radio 7
51. SALEM MEDIA GROUP INC Radio 8
52. SINCLAIR BROADCAST GROUP INC Television 10
53. SIRIUS XM HOLDINGS INC Radio 13
54. SOCIAL REALITY INC Advertising 5
55. SPANISH BROADCASTING SYSTEM INC Radio 6
56. TEGNA INC Television 11
57. TELARIA INC Advertising 8
58. THE TRADE DESK INC Advertising 8
59. THESTREET INC Newspaper 7
60. TOWNSQUARE MEDIA INC Radio 7
(Continued)
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conglomerates’ boards. Director compensation by media sector ranged widely across the
seven media sectors from $210,019 to $653,755 (see Table 2).
This research hypothesised that although today’s media conglomerates across the seven
sectors di#ered in adaption to technological change (Tatarynowicz et al., 2016), inter!rm
interlocks with digital or technological organisations will be present across all sectors. This
hypothesis was supported. Adaption to technological change among inter!rm interlocks
with digital or technological organisationswere present across all seven sectors (see Table 3).
The digital and technological resource category among interlocked directorships ranged
from 4% (cable) to 23% (motion picture and video production) across sectors.
The second research question explored the social networks of today’s media conglom-
erates’ inter!rm interlocks, the architecture these networks depict, and the dependency
and exchange of resources that might "ow through these network structures. To address
this research question, the initial ego networks collected and reported above were
combined to form two whole networks: one organisation-to-individual network and
one organisation-to-organisation network. The organisation-to-individual network
examines the connections among the media conglomerates and the individuals who
serve on those boards. The organisation-to-organisation network examines the connec-
tions among the media conglomerates and each directors’ connected organisation, or put
another way, the inter!rm interlocks across all seven media sectors. This research was the
!rst to include the advertising sector within an investigation of media interlocks, and in
support of the second hypothesis, three advertising conglomerates were among the top 20
most central organisations in the organisation-to-organisation network: the Interpublic
Group of Companies Inc, MDC Partners Inc, and Omnicom Group (see Table 4).
Table 2. Director compensation by inter!rm interlock resource category.
n M SD %
ADVERTISERS 71 $244,542 $200,288 11.6
DIGITAL-TECH 47 $273,470 $527,946 7.7
FINANCIAL 175 $210,019 $154,208 28.7
GOVT/ED/NPO* 44 $653,755 $2,702,956 7.2
LAW 17 $311,118 $327,520 2.7
MEDIA* 112 $644,816 $3,798,085 18.3
ALL COMBINED 579 $1,387,752 $4,917,569
*Outliers in these categories. These outliers are directors who were also compensated
executives.
In the Government/Education/Non-Pro!t Organisation category: Gregory E Abel, Berkshire
Hathaway Energy, public utilities [salary: $18,013,750].
In the Media category: Stephen B Burke, NBCUniversal, [salary: $39,959,015], Rupert Murdoch,
Fox Corporation, [salary: $5,742,610].
Table 1. (Continued).
Media Conglomerate Media Sector
Number of
Directors
61. TRAVELZOO Digital Advertising 5
62. TRIBUNE MEDIA COMPANY Television 5
63. TRIBUNE PUBLISHING COMPANY Newspaper 6
64. URBAN ONE INC Radio 6
65. VIACOM INC Cable 9
66. WALT DISNEY COMPANY Television 16
67. WIDEOPENWEST INC Cable 9
68. WORLD WRESTLING ENTERTAINMENT INC Motion Picture/Video 11
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Table 3. Inter!rm interlock resource categories by media sector.
n % n %
ADVERTISING 126 NEWSPAPERS 111
Finance 37 29 Finance 22 20
Org 26 21 Org 20 18
Advertisers 25 20 Govt/Ed/NPO 20 18
Media 18 14 Media 19 17
Digital 14 11 Advertisers 16 14
Govt/Ed/NPO 4 3 Digital 11 10
Law 2 2 Law 3 3
CABLE 100 RADIO 103
Finance 34 34 Finance 36 35
Media 32 32 Org 26 25
Org 15 15 Media 20 19
Advertisers 6 6 Advertisers 8 8
Law 6 6 Govt/Ed/NPO 7 7
Digital 4 4 Digital 5 5
Govt/Ed/NPO 3 3 Law 1 1
DIGITAL AD 22 TV 125
Finance 8 36 Finance 42 34
Advertisers 6 27 Org 26 21
Org 4 18 Media 20 16
Media 2 9 Advertisers 14 11
Digital 1 5 Govt/Ed/NPO 9 7
Govt/Ed/NPO 1 5 Digital 8 6



















AMC NETWORKS INC 13 4578.91 0.000750 0.009408
SIRIUS XM HOLDINGS INC 12 4038.12 0.000749 0.009408
NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY 12 4338.05 0.000749 0.009140
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS INC 12 4362.78 0.000749 0.009023
CBS CORPORATION 12 4606.74 0.000749 0.008861
DISCOVERY INC 11 3670.82 0.000748 0.009010
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC 11 3870.94 0.000748 0.008997
COMCAST CORPORATION 11 3871.93 0.000748 0.008983
INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF COMPANIES
INC
11 4217.61 0.000748 0.008599
TEGNA INC 11 4377.33 0.000748 0.008598
MCCLATCHY COMPANY 11 4381.33 0.000748 0.008577
MDC PARTNERS INC 11 4456.96 0.000748 0.008461
OMNICOM GROUP INC 10 3678.59 0.000747 0.008593
GANNETT CO INC 10 3752.61 0.000747 0.008467
NETFLIX INC 10 3986.93 0.000747 0.008343
GREY TELEVISION INC 10 4230.00 0.000747 0.008208
ROPER TECHNOLOGIES INC 10 4230.00 0.000747 0.008208
HEMISPHERE MEDIA GROUP INC 9 2633.84 0.000746 0.008968
GRAHAM HOLDINGS COMPANY 9 2514.73 0.000746 0.008833
VIACOM INC 9 2896.87 0.000746 0.008720
Media Sectors: Advertising (n = 4), Cable (n = 4), Motion Picture/Video Production (n = 1), Newspaper (n = 5), Radio
(n = 1), and Television (n = 5).
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The organisation-to-individual network depicts the most connected directors among
today’s U.S. media conglomerates (see Figure 1). The top 10 most central directors
include: Brian G Sweeney, Charles F Dolan, James L Dolan, Kristin A Dolan, Thomas
C Dolan, William J Bell, Carl E Vogel, Jonathan FMiller, David E Van Zandt, and Frank J
Biondi, Jr. The Dolan family is tied to three of the conglomerates included in this
research: Altice USA Inc (Cablevision), AMC Networks Inc, and MSG Networks Inc.
Carl Vogel serves on the board of three conglomerates: AMC Networks Inc, DISH
Network Corporation, and Sirius XM Holdings Inc. Mr Vogel’s employment organisa-
tion, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co, boasts the highest eigenvector centrality among all
connected organisations, which is discussed next.
Eigenvector centrality, a network measurement of connectivity, also was calculated
regarding directors’ organisations. The top 10 directors’ organisations most connected
throughout the media conglomerates’ social network include: Kohlberg Kravis Roberts &
Co, NBCUniversal, Liberty Media Corporation, Harvard University, Sony Pictures
Entertainment, CBS, General Motors Company, Google, Time Warner, and Munger
Tolles & Olson.
Figure 1. Organisation-to-individual social network of media conglomerates across seven sectors in
the U.S., by eigenvector centrality.
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And !nally, director compensation is visualised as a sociogram to show the tie
strength among the seven media sectors and six resource categories (see Figure 2). The
wider the line between a media sector and a resource category, the higher the director
compensation.
In sum, the inter!rm interlocks of publicly traded U.S. media conglomerates
across the seven media sectors were revealed in this research. The directors, along-
side their compensation operationalised as the strength of a dyadic tie between the
media conglomerate and its directors, and directors’ most recent employer, depict
the resources sought out by media conglomerates when forming organisational
leadership structures. The centrality analyses and visualisation capabilities of the
network perspective adds explanatory value to this investigation and allows a multi-
level, multi-theoretical approach to such sociological phenomenon. Next, results are
discussed through the lens of social resource theory to further explain the research
questions and hypotheses.
Discussion
This research set out to identify seven media sectors’ inter!rm interlocks to investigate
the resource-dependent alliance networks established among media organisations oper-
ating in the United States of America. Media conglomerates’ inter!rm interlocks were
investigated by gathering each conglomerate’s board of directors and examining each U.
Figure 2.Media conglomerates’ director compensation by resource categorisation across seven media
sectors in the U.S.
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S. media sector’s social network and desired resource categories, as evidenced by their
directorship alliances. The application of the network perspective to this examination
o#ered an in-depth explanatory overview of U.S. media conglomerates’ inter!rm inter-
lock alliance networks and the resources exchanged among those networks. Further, the
collection of compensation data delineated to which resource categories conglomerates
are funnelling their funds as deemed necessary for continued business operations, over-
sight, and for resource exchange.
This study mirrored past research regarding media conglomerates (An & Jin, 2005,
2004; Artero, 2009; Han, 1988; Picard, 1994; Simmons, 2012, 2011) by including news-
paper publishers and other sectors of news-disseminating conglomerates like broadcast
radio and television (Han, 1988; Simmons, 2012). A common theme among the !ndings
of those past media-related studies was that advertisers were a critical resource category
and therefore a common inter!rm interlock. None, however, examined purposeful
interlocking connections with advertising agencies, which largely control the placement
of advertisements throughout all other media sectors. This study !lled that gap.
This research indicates that the number of publicly traded media conglomerates across
sectors are shrinking and fewer directors are serving. In the last decade, the number of publicly
traded media conglomerates has shrunk from 73 in 2008 (Simmons, 2011) to 68 across all
seven media sectors, and the number of directors have fallen – from 11.94 in the 1980s (Han,
1988) to 8.95 today. Recall here that this research extended the number ofmedia sectors under
review from those conducted in the past so today’s number is considerably smaller than that of
decades past. The fewer the number of directors, themore power each possess (Schoorman et
al., 1981). These results should leavemedia producers andmedia consumers concerned for the
future viability of some sectors of the information industry in the U.S.
Simmons (2012) found that media conglomerates that experienced the highest levels of
environmental uncertainty recruited directors from !nancial institutions and advertisers.
While !nancial interlocks are still the top resource category for each sector, !nancial
interlocks are secondary to the overall media resource category, today. Also, the makeup of
!nancial interlocks are very di#erent today than in the past and technological change and
resource dependency are having lasting e#ects on media inter!rm interlocks. These
matters are all discussed in more detail in the sections that follow, but !rst a discussion
regarding the central role of advertising agencies across U.S. media sectors is presented.
Advertising agencies hold a central position within U.S. media
This research is the !rst to integrate publicly traded advertising agencies into an investiga-
tion of media conglomerate inter!rm interlocks. Past studies have categorised advertisers
only as a resource category and !ndings of each of those studies note statistical support for
the connection between advertisers serving on boards of directors and !nancial health (An
& Jin, 2005, 2004; Han, 1988; Simmons, 2011). This research highlights that advertising
agencies are both a media sector and a resource category within the U.S. media ecosystem.
As a result, and in support of the second hypothesis, numerous publicly-traded advertising
conglomerates were central to the overall U.S. media industry network.
In fact, four advertising conglomerates were among the top 20 most central media
conglomerates in the whole network: the Interpublic Group of Companies Inc, MDC
Partners Inc, Omnicom Group, and Roper Technologies Inc. The Interpublic Group of
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Companies Inc, the parent company of McCann and 94 other advertising and public
relations agencies, is interlocked with AMC Networks Inc, and by relation to MSG
Networks and Altice USA Inc (Cablevision). Omnicom, the parent to over 1,500 agencies,
also is central in the network, is connected to Graham Holdings Company through its
directorship interlock with Cable One. Larry Kramer serves on three boards, thus inter-
locking the three: Gannett, TheStreet, and MDC Partners Inc. MDC Partners is an adver-
tising and marketing holding company partnered with over 50 agencies. See Figure 1 for a
visualisation of these and other connections.
An and Jin (2005) reported that advertiser interlocks reduces operational uncertainty and
secures capital (p. 22). The authors go so far as to assert that “ties to leading advertisers
increased corporate !nancial performance, while ties to !nancial institutions did not” (p. 23).
A modern-day example of what An and Jin described is the relationship between The Walt
Disney Company and General Motors (GM). Marry Bara, GM’s CEO, serves on Disney’s
board of directors. GM enjoys ongoing product-placement deals with Disney. For example,
GM’s Chevrolet line are the featured vehicles in “Captain America: The Winter Soldier”
(McCarthy, 2014). This partnership demonstrates a mutual bene!t in that GMmay pay less
in advertising dollars while Disney reduces operational uncertainty and secures capital (An
& Jin, 2005). The Disney-GM alliance are the very type of alliances that can reduce
operational uncertainty, secure capital, and “increase corporate !nancial performance” for
media companies (An & Jin, 2005, pp. 22–23), and more conglomerates should follow suit.
Alliance networks for technological change
This research hypothesised that media conglomerates have adapted to the technological
change brought on by the turn of the century’s mass emergence of technological
advancement with the spread of the internet. The hypothesis that technological change
would be re"ected among interlocked directorships with digital or technological orga-
nisations was supported across all seven sectors. Tatarynowicz et al. (2016) asserted that
organisations can expand their network by embracing technological change through
increased collaborative e#orts by pursuing “more diverse resources and knowledge [for]
critical inputs to innovation” (p. 54).
Media conglomerates appear to be embracing this strategy, albeit slowly. For example,
the newest board member for the newly-merged Gannett/New Media conglomerate is
Mayur Gupta, a digital marketing expert. Today’s media conglomerates are interlocking
with cutting-edge technological advances including one virtual reality !rm, four arti!cial
intelligence !rms, one bitcoin !rm, and two cybersecurity !rms. Interlocks that match
environmental needs perform better (Zona et al., 2018), and interlocks that address
technological change are the perfect example of how strategic alliances form to aid
organisations with resource exchange (An & Jin, 2005; Simmons, 2012).
Still though, the number of technology and adverting interlocks were not as prevalent
as media scholars might hypothesise given some media sectors’ level of environmental
uncertainty or need for consistent technological change to remain competitive. In fact,
economic instability remains a top concern for some sectors, as is demonstrated by the
number and type of !nancial interlocks found in this investigation. The next section
reviews the industry’s !nancial interlocks and discusses how these types of interlocks can
lead to cooptation.
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Financial interlocks among U.S. media conglomerates
What’s been missing from past research regarding inter!rm interlocks and resource
dependency, and what serves as food for thought for media economists, is a speci!c focus
on the types of !nancial interlocks U.S. media conglomerates have initiated. This section
discusses how these speci!c and functional alliances have changed in recent decades and
why conglomerates should take heed of their e#ects.
Financial interlocks held the highest prevalence among directorships in every sector
except the motion pictures sector. These !nancial interlocks ranged from 20% to 36% of
each media sector’s board makeup, and is the most compensated resource category. The
vast majority of !nancial interlocks were with directors connected with investors, hedge
funds, venture capitalists, and private equity !rms. Few traditional banking institutions
were interlocked across all seven media sectors, a stark di#erence from Han’s (1988) study.
In a general sense, !nancial interlocks have been hypothesised as o#ering access to the
necessary resources for operational bene!t and for expertise regarding !nancial matters
(An & Jin, 2005; Han, 1988), but what has become evident, especially within the newspaper
sector, is that !nancial interlocks are having long-lasting negative e#ects on the reshaping
of directorships, even inciting directorship wars. Cooptation (i.e. surrendering some
autonomy in return for resources) is becoming more recognisable as majority shareholders
are mandating placement of preferred directors due to majority stock agreements in these
resource-dependent interlocks. This current research found that exactly half of all !nancial
interlocks across all seven media sectors were with investment, equity, and venture capital
!rms, and only six interlocks existed with banks or credit institutions. The current makeup
of !nancial interlocks looks very di#erent from the snapshot captured by An and Jin (2005,
see p. 19) regarding the newspaper sector at that time. One must ask, once the boards of
directors are under majority !nancial control with venture capital investors, what will
happen to the U.S. information industry?
Financial interlocks possess an inherent potential for in"uence over an organisation
(Picard, 1994). Moreover, !nancial interlocks oftentimes hold the most powerful posi-
tions. Take, for example, the 2019 merger between Gannett and New Media Investment
Group. The merger was negotiated with each organisation’s CEO and board chairman as
the lead negotiators. John Je#ry Louis was Gannett’s board chairman and is co-founder of
Parson Capital Corporation, a venture capital !rm. Wes Edens has served as New
Media’s board chairman since its inception when the organisation was structured to
consume Gatehouse Media Inc after bankruptcy. Edens also is co-CEO of Fortress
Investment Group LLC, a global investment management !rm. Fortress, according to
media reports (Kirchen, 2019) and the SEC !lings regarding the merger, is at the
forefront of the restructuring for the newly-merged mammoth media organisation.
Edens now provides oversight to what is arguably the largest U.S. newspaper conglom-
erate in history. Edens and Fortress additionally have !nancial business ties to the Trump
International Hotel and Tower in Chicago (Sheth, 2019), is co-owner of the Milwaukee
Bucks, and an investor in the Bucks’ new Fiserv Forum arena where the 2020 Democratic
National Convention will take place (Murphy, 2019).
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Social resource theory and U.S. media inter!rm interlocks
The application of social resource theory aided in this examination of the architecture
and "ow of today’s inter!rm interlocks across seven sectors of U.S. media via the lens of
dependency and exchange network assumptions (Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell, 2011; Lin,
2017; Monge & Contractor, 2003). Social resource theory guided this research by focus-
ing on the network structures of the media conglomerates’ interlocks to explore the
similarities, social relations, and interactions among the interlocked organisations and
individuals (Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell, 2011; Himelboim, Golan, Moon, & Suto, 2014).
Recall here that a network’s architecture reveals a node’s position and its dependency on,
or ability to reach, other nodes to exchange resources throughout the network. A node’s
network position helps a researcher decipher whether a node is resource-rich or
resource-poor or whether a partnership is a horizontal partnership or a vertical hierarchy
(Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell, 2011). Taken together, social resource theory explains that
interlocks such as the one between MDC Partners and Gannett is strategic, functional,
and mutually bene!cial because both conglomerates’ income is at least partially reliant on
advertising sales. MDC Partners services advertisers and therefore has ties to social and
economic connections that would bene!t Gannett economically. MDC Partners have a
higher degree centrality than Gannett within the network, therefore, making MDC
Partners vertically superior to Gannett.
Mizruchi (1996) once noted traditional “interlock analyses fail to capture the richness
and complexity of board dynamics and inter!rm relations” (p. 292). The current research
supports that assertation and extends prior literature with the inclusion of relationship
intensity. For example, this social network analysis assessed centrality measurements,
network reach, and applied functional speci!city (Perry & Pescosolido, 2010; Weiss,
1974; Wellman & Wortley, 1990) to investigate alliances (Beckman et al., 2004) among
inter!rm interlocks for mutual bene!t, and this research ultimately revealed that the
business of U.S. media is a family a#air.
Media conglomerates possess kinship ties among directorships, executives, and other
conglomerates and inter!rm interlocks. The eigenvector centrality measurements in the
organisation-to-individual social network depicts these phenomena and the implications of
these familial ties regarding resource exchange and dependency. The Dolan family, for
example, are tied to several conglomerates, including AMC Networks Inc and MSG
Networks Inc. The proxy reports for these organisations include disclaimers regarding the
sharing of costs for o$ce space for Charles Dolan and other family members and re"ects
preferential spending among the interlocked family’s businesses, therefore securing capital by
accessing resources more freely than non-family members. Several other instances of familial
ties re"ect conglomerate consumption of competitormedia organisations. For example, News
Corporation acquired Dow Jones, which was owned by Bancroft family, andNatalie Bancroft
serves on the News Corporation board. Other conglomerates with familial interlocks include:
Beasley Broadcast Group, Cox, E.W. Scripps, Graham Holdings Company (formerly
Washington Post), New York Times Co, Salem Media Group Inc, Sinclair Broadcast Group,
and Spanish Broadcasting. Salem Media Group Inc also mentioned in its proxy report that
several directors are customers.
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Practical implications and conclusion
The practical implications of this research include three main recommendations for media
conglomerates: (1) a thorough review of current directors alongside an assessment of
resource dependency to create mutually bene!cial strategic alliances; (2) to ease up on
media directors, familial ties, and the number of internal directors to diversify access to
resources; and (3) to conduct threat assessments regarding !nancial interlocks. To explain,
directors serve for speci!ed terms (some longer, some shorter than others) and then as the
termnears its end, the director goes up for re-electionwith no service cap on howmany total
years a director can serve. Conglomerates in this study had directors who have served for
decades. Perhaps U.S. media conglomerates should review these relationships and assess
whether those directors are still speci!c, functional strategic alliances formutual bene!t and
resource exchange (Perry & Pescosolido, 2010; Weiss, 1974; Wellman & Wortley, 1990).
Furthermore, 40%ofdirectorships across all sevenmedia sectorsweremadeupof the resource
category of media, which includes their own executives. Inter!rm interlocks must diversify their
directorships to gain access to more resources. In network theory, these ties are considered
redundant and limiting to information or resource exchange (Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell, 2011).
While these conglomerates do need some industry-speci!c governance and expertise, diversify-
ing resource categories among directorships would garner more favourable bottom-line results.
Also, some !nancial connections can possess larger, more macro repercussions. The vast
di#erence in the makeup of !nancial ties today from before the turn of the century depicts a
staggering turn to venture capitalists and independent !nanciers, instead of banking institutions.
As recentlywitnessedwith theGannett-NewMediamerger, andFortress’ rolewithin thatmerger
(Kirchen, 2019), !nancial ties should be closely monitored and diversi!ed in an e#ort to spread
resource exchange, reduce resource dependency with any one !nancier, and thus provide
protections against such power di#erentials regarding cooptation.
As with any social science investigation, limitations exist. This study is based upon publicly
available information gathered and veri!ed across online governmental and educational
databases. It is possible that each conglomerate’s list of directors could omit individuals or
not include recent departures. Although every attempt was made to verify such facts with
reputable sources, no true census can ever fully be achieved. Still though, this dataset o#ers
enough of a sample of the !scal year 2018 social network ofmedia conglomerates operating in
the U.S. to generalise the discussion o#ered above and the recommendations that followed.
Also, this research was not longitudinal like other interlocking research of the past (Mizruchi
& Stearns, 1988; Palmer et al., 1986; Zajac &Westphal, 1996), including those focused onU.S.
media (An & Jin, 2005, 2004; Simmons, 2012), but instead is a snapshot of one point in time.
As such, a limitation to this work is that the data period includes the most recently reported
year only (2018), so the number of directors serving on more than one media board
simultaneously (n = 28) is not a historical re"ection of industry norms.
Future research might examine the economic impact of interlocks to assess the !nancial
health of U. S. media conglomerates. Moreover, Simmons (2012) asserted that conglomerates
were not interlocking “to deal with industry-level media consolidation” (p. 69). The current
research suggests otherwise, so this also would be an interesting future research approach.
In conclusion, this research set out to examine today’s inter!rm interlocks among publicly
traded U.S. media conglomerates across seven media sectors. The network perspective added
explanatory value into this investigation through the application of social resource theory,
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functional speci!city, and the assessment of resource exchange and dependency. Results
indicate that inter!rm interlocks among U.S. media conglomerates demonstrate resource
exchange but some sectors (e.g. the newspaper sector) have fallen victim to cooptation.
Financial interlocks have evolved from banking institutions in the 1980s to venture capitalist
and investment !rms in the 2010s, thus forming dependent interlocks that are continually
reshaping directorships, inciting directorship wars, and collapsing some sectors. The unique
inclusion of the advertising sector in this research highlights the strategic and bene!cial alliance
opportunities available to U.S. media to secure capital and reduce environmental uncertainty.
Moreover, the advertising sector was central and well-connected to the overall U.S. media
network because of its unique ability to double as a resource category. Technological adaption
also was evidenced in this investigation and themost recent inter!rm interlocks reveal resource
exchange with an array of digital and technological !rms. Still though, media directorships
could improve strategic alliances if each conglomerate diversi!es its board with fewer media
and familial interlocks for broader resource exchange. Overall, this research identi!ed the
current social resources available through the interlocks of publicly traded U.S. media con-
glomerates’ directorships across seven media sectors and the results of this research suggest
where the strengths and weaknesses exist in today’s U.S. media ecosystem.
Notes
1. The NAICS Information sector brings together those activities that transform information
into a commodity that is produced and distributed, and activities that provide the means for
distributing those products. Industries included in this sector are telecommunications;
broadcasting; newspaper, book, and periodical publishing; motion picture and sound
recording industries; libraries; and other information services (Census.gov).
2. The data that support the !ndings of this study are available from the corresponding author,
[JLH], upon request.
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